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FAA V. COOPER:
HOW THE COURT STRIPPED
THE PRIVACY ACT OF
ITS PURPOSE AND MEANING
Anna Kim*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 19741 (the “Act”) in order
“to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion
of personal privacy” by federal agencies.2 To that end, the Act sets
forth a comprehensive framework regulating federal agencies in the
management of an individual’s confidential records.3 It also contains
a civil remedies provision that allows an individual to bring civil
lawsuits against the federal government and to recover “actual
damages” for an agency’s violation of the Act that has had an
adverse effect on the individual.4
The term “actual damages” does not have a plain or ordinary
meaning,5 and Congress did not provide a clear definition of it in the
Act.6 Thus, the meaning of “actual damages,” as used in the civil

* J.D., May 2013, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 2010, University of California,
San Diego. I owe my gratitude to Professor Gary Williams for his invaluable guidance and
insight; Andrew Arons, Leslie Hinshaw, Sean Degarmo, and Scott Klausner for their editorial
judgment; and the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their diligence
and dedication. I also owe a special thanks to my family and friends for being my continual
source of love, joy, and encouragement.
1. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
2. See id. § 2(b). “In 1974, Congress was concerned with curbing the illegal surveillance
and investigation of individuals by federal agencies that had been exposed during the Watergate
scandal.” OFFICE OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE
PRIVACY ACT 4 (2010) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974privacyact.pdf, quoted in FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1462
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
4. See id. § 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4)(A).
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
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remedies provision of the Act, has been the subject of much debate,
and lower courts had been split on the question of whether actual
damages are limited to pecuniary losses or whether they also include
nonpecuniary losses such as mental or emotional distress.7
In March of the 2011–2012 term, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided FAA v. Cooper8 and resolved the lower courts’
disagreement over the meaning of the term “actual damages” in the
Act. In Cooper, Stanmore Cooper, a private pilot, filed suit against
three federal agencies, claiming that they violated the Act by
disclosing his confidential information and that their violation caused
him mental and emotional distress.9 Since the Court could have
plausibly construed the Act’s civil remedies provision to mean that
Congress did not intend to waive the federal government’s sovereign
immunity from liability for only nonpecuniary harm, the Court held
that the term “actual damages,” in the context of the Privacy Act,
refers only to economic or pecuniary losses.10 Cooper was thus
unable to recover under the Act.11
The Court’s ruling creates a troubling gap between the
substantive and remedial provisions of the Act and leaves a large
number of injured individuals without any form of meaningful relief.
Thus, this Comment argues that the Court incorrectly determined in
FAA v. Cooper that Congress could have intended the civil remedies
provision of the Act to offer relief only to those individuals who have
suffered some form of economic or pecuniary harm. Part II of the
Comment lays out the relevant factual and procedural backgrounds,
and Part III explains the Court’s reasoning and analysis. Part IV then
argues that the Court (1) failed to recognize clear congressional
intent reflected in the Act’s context, language, and purpose; and (2)

7. For example, both the Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit had interpreted “actual
damages” under the Act to mean strictly pecuniary losses. See, e.g., Fanin v. U.S. Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2009); Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1207 (6th
Cir. 1997); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 328 (11th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit and the Fifth
Circuit, however, had adopted a more liberal interpretation of “actual damages” to include
nonpecuniary losses as well. See, e.g., Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010),
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012); Johnson v. Dep’t of Treasury, IRS, 700 F.2d 971, 986 (5th Cir.
1983).
8. 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012).
9. Id. at 1446−47.
10. Id. at 1456.
11. Id.
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improperly relied on Doe v. Chao12 and the Act’s legislative history
to find ambiguity and apply the sovereign immunity canon. Finally,
Part V concludes by explaining the significant implications of the
Court’s narrow reading of the term “actual damages.” It also calls
upon Congress to legislatively overturn the Court’s holding by
amending the Act to clearly state that violations of the Act entitle
injured individuals to awards of monetary damages for both
economic and noneconomic injuries.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to
obtain a pilot certificate and a medical certificate in order to operate
an aircraft.13 Because the FAA did not issue medical certificates to
persons with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) at the time
Cooper was diagnosed with HIV in 1985, Cooper did not apply for a
medical certificate.14
Cooper later applied for a medical certificate in 1994 without
disclosing his HIV status or the antiretroviral medication he had been
taking for his virus, and the FAA issued him a medical certificate.15
In 1995, Cooper’s health deteriorated, and he applied for longterm disability benefits with the Social Security Administration
(SSA) under Title II of the Social Security Act.16 As part of this
process, Cooper disclosed his HIV status to the SSA and received
benefits from August 1995 to August 1996.17
Cooper then renewed his medical certificate with the FAA in
1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004, each time withholding information
about his HIV status and medication.18
Cooper’s intentional concealment of his medical condition was
revealed in 2002, when the Department of Transportation (DOT) and
the SSA launched “Operation Safe Pilot,” a joint criminal
investigation aimed at identifying pilots who were medically unfit
but had received FAA certifications to fly.19 As part of the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

540 U.S. 614 (2004).
14 C.F.R. § 61.3(a), (c) (2011).
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1446.
Id.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–34 (1994).
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1446.
Id.
Id. at 1446−47.
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investigation, the DOT provided the SSA with the names and other
identifying information of forty-five thousand pilots who were
licensed in Northern California.20 The SSA compared this
information with the names of individuals who had received longterm disability benefits under the Social Security Act. 21 The SSA
then provided the DOT with a spreadsheet of its results, which
revealed that Cooper held a current medical certificate despite also
having received benefits from the SSA.22 The FAA determined that it
would not have issued Cooper a medical certificate if he had
truthfully disclosed his HIV status.23
Cooper admitted to the investigators that he intentionally
concealed information about his medical condition from the FAA.24
Thereafter, the FAA revoked Cooper’s pilot certificate for fraudulent
omissions, and a grand jury indicted him “on three counts of making
false statements to a Government agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.”25 Cooper “pleaded guilty to one count of making and
delivering a false official writing,” and he received two years of
probation and a fine of $1,000.26
Cooper then filed suit against the FAA, DOT, and SSA
(collectively the “Government”) in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.27 He claimed that the Government
violated the Act by sharing his confidential information28 and alleged
that the unlawful disclosure “caused him ‘humiliation,
embarrassment, mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and other
severe emotional distress.’”29 Cooper did not allege pecuniary or
economic losses.30

20. Id. at 1446.
21. Id. at 1446–47.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1447.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) prohibits agencies from “disclos[ing] any record which is
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another
agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006).
29. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
120a, Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (No. 10-1024)).
30. Id.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Government.31 It determined that, while the Government violated the
Act and there was a triable issue as to whether its violation was
intentional or willful,32 Cooper was not entitled to recover any
damages because he failed to allege any pecuniary or economic
losses.33 Relying on various decisions in which the Ninth Circuit
held that “actual damages” meant “economic loss” in some contexts
and “emotional distress and humiliation” in others,34 the district court
determined that “the term ‘actual damages’ is facially ambiguous.”35
The court then applied the sovereign immunity canon,36 construed
the term in favor of the Government, and held that “mental distress
alone does not satisfy the Privacy Act’s actual damages
requirement.”37
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded.38 Recognizing that the term “actual
damages” is in fact ambiguous, the court applied traditional tools of

31. Cooper v. FAA, 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012).
32. See id. at 790.
With certain exceptions, it is unlawful for an agency to disclose a record to another
agency without the written consent of the person to whom the record pertains. One
exception to this nondisclosure requirement applies when the head of an agency makes
a written request for law enforcement purposes to the agency that maintains the record.
The agencies in this case could easily have shared [Cooper’s] medical records pursuant
to the procedures prescribed by the Privacy Act, but the District Court concluded that
they failed to do so.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1447 n.2 (citations omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (b)(7)).
33. See Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
34. Id. at 791. In Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that, for purposes
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), “actual damages” requires “some form of
economic loss.” 556 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1977). In Mackie v. Rieser, the Ninth Circuit again
held that, in the context of copyright infringement, “actual damages” must include some form of
“objective[ly]” measurable financial loss. 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002). For violations of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, however, the Ninth Circuit held that emotional
distress and humiliation alone can constitute “actual damages.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit
Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995).
35. Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
36. See id. at 792. Under the sovereign immunity canon, “a waiver of [the federal
government’s] sovereign immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.” Cooper,
132 S. Ct. at 1448 (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). “Any ambiguities in the
statutory language are to be construed in favor of immunity, so that the Government’s consent to
be sued is never enlarged beyond what a fair reading of the text requires.” Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at
1448 (citations omitted).
37. Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
38. Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012).
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statutory interpretation39 and concluded that “Congress clearly
intended that when a federal agency intentionally or willfully fails to
uphold its record-keeping obligations under the [Privacy] Act, and
that failure proximately causes an adverse effect on the plaintiff, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
injuries.”40 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise “would be an
unreasonable construction of the Act.”41
The Government petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en
banc, but the Ninth Circuit denied the petitions.42 The Government
then petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and the Court granted
certiorari.43
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The issue before the Court was whether the Privacy Act waived
the Government’s sovereign immunity from liability for
nonpecuniary harms such as mental or emotional distress. 44 This
required the Court to determine whether Congress unequivocally
intended the term “actual damages,” as used in the Act’s civilremedies provision, to include damages for mental or emotional
distress.45 In a 5−3 decision,46 the Court held that Congress did not
unequivocally authorize damages for nonpecuniary harms and that,
therefore, the Act did not waive the Government’s sovereign
immunity from liability for Cooper’s strictly nonpecuniary losses.47
The subject remedial provision of the Act allows an individual
to bring a civil action against a federal agency that “fails to comply
with [the provisions of the Act] . . . in such a way as to have an
adverse effect on [the] individual.”48 If the agency’s violation is
found to be “intentional or willful,” the United States is liable for

39. See id. at 1028−29, 1035. The court looked to “intrinsic sources”—the plain meaning of
the statute—and, upon determining that there is no plain meaning to “actual damages,” looked to
“extrinsic sources,” such as the Act’s legislative history and the use of the term “actual damages”
in other statutes. Id. at 1028−33.
40. Id. at 1035.
41. Id. at 1030.
42. See id. at 1019.
43. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012).
44. See id. at 1446, 1448.
45. Id. at 1448.
46. Id. at 1445. Justice Kagan did not participate in the decision. Id. at 1456.
47. Id. at 1456.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (2006).
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“actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal
or failure [to comply], but in no case shall a person entitled to
recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.”49
Writing for the majority in Cooper, Justice Alito stated that
“‘actual damages’ is a legal term of art”50 and that “[e]ven as a legal
term, . . . the meaning of ‘actual damages’ is far from clear.”51 The
Court also pointed to the term’s “chameleon-like quality”52 and then
applied other tools of statutory construction to examine the meaning
of the term within the specific context of the Act.53
The Court first stated the purpose of the Act: “[T]o establish
safeguards to protect individuals against the disclosure of
confidential records ‘which could result in substantial harm,
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on
whom information is maintained.’”54 The Court then noted that “the
Act serves interests similar to those protected by defamation and
privacy torts”55 and that it previously has recognized in Doe v. Chao
that the Act’s remedial provision “‘parallels’ the remedial scheme for
the common-law torts of libel per quod and slander.”56 Based on the
parallels previously drawn, the Court relied heavily on defamation
and privacy torts to infer a plausible congressional intent of the
Act.57

49. Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A).
50. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1449 (citing Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2010),
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012)).
51. Id. The Court cited to the definition of “actual damages” provided in the Black’s Law
Dictionary available at the time of the enactment of the Act and concluded that it was of minimal
guidance. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
52. Id. at 1450. The Court provided examples of how the term “actual damages” has been
interpreted differently in different statutes. For example, it has been interpreted to encompass
nonpecuniary damages in the Fair Housing Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act but has been
limited to only pecuniary damages in the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Copyright Act of 1901.
Id. at 1449.
53. See id. at 1450−53. Unlike the district court, which automatically resorted to the
sovereign immunity canon after determining that the term is ambiguous in the statute, Cooper v.
FAA, 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 792 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132
S. Ct. 1441 (2012), the Supreme Court recognized that the sovereign immunity canon is merely
one “tool for interpreting the law” and that it does not “displac[e] the other traditional tools of
statutory construction.” Id. at 1448 (alteration in original) (quoting Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v.
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589 (2008)).
54. See id. at 1450 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1451 (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 (2004)).
57. See id. at 1450−53.
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Under the common law torts of libel per quod and slander,
plaintiffs are entitled to recover “general damages” so long as they
first prove “special damages.”58 General damages “cover ‘loss of
reputation, shame, mortification, injury to the feelings and the like
and need not be alleged in detail and require no proof.’”59 Special
damages, on the other hand, include only proven pecuniary loss.60
The Court reasoned that the parallels between the Act and the torts of
libel per quod and slander suggest that “Congress [likely] intended
‘actual damages’ in the Privacy Act to mean special damages . . . .”61
Thus, the Court held that an individual must first demonstrate that he
or she suffered some pecuniary or economic loss—“no matter how
slight”—in order to recover the statutory minimum of $1,000 under
the Act.62
The majority further supported this determination with the Act’s
legislative history.63 It cited to an uncodified section of the Act in
which the Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC), established
by Congress to consider “whether the Federal Government should be
liable for general damages,” recommended that Congress allow
recovery for general damages.64 Because Congress never amended
the Act to authorize “general damages,” despite the PPSC’s
recommendation, the Court reasoned that “Congress [likely] intended
‘actual damages’ in the Privacy Act to mean special damages . . . .”65
For these reasons, the Court held that “it is plausible to read the
statute . . . to authorize only damages for economic loss”66 and that
Congress did not unequivocally waive sovereign immunity from

58. Id. at 1451 (citing Chao, 540 U.S. at 625).
59. Id. at 1451 & n.7 (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. AVERY HAGGARD, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 164, at
579 (4th ed. 1932) [hereinafter COOLEY & HAGGARD]).
60. Id. at 1451 & n.6 (citing COOLEY & HAGGARD, supra note 59, § 164, at 580).
61. See id. at 1451.
62. See id. The Court also noted that it is insignificant that Congress used the term “actual
damages” instead of “special damages” since Congress has often used those terms
interchangeably. See id. at 1451–52.
63. See id. at 1452−53.
64. Id. at 1452 (emphasis added) (citing Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579,
§ 5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1896, 1907 (1974)).
65. Id. The majority also added that the fact that PPSC later “understood ‘actual damages’ in
the Act to be ‘a synonym for special damages’” further supports its holding. Id. at 1452−53
(quoting U.S. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 530 (1977)).
66. See id. at 1453 (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34, 37 (1992)).
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liability for nonpecuniary damages.67 Thus, the Court applied the
sovereign immunity canon and declined to “expand the scope of
Congress’s sovereign immunity waiver beyond what the statutory
text clearly requires.”68
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COOPER COURT’S REASONING
The Supreme Court erred in Cooper by (1) failing to recognize
the clear congressional expression of waiver of sovereign immunity;
and (2) improperly relying on Doe v. Chao and the legislative history
of the Act.
A. The Cooper Court Failed to Find
a Clear Congressional Expression of Waiver
First, Congress articulated in the Congressional Findings and
Statement of Purpose attached to the Privacy Act that
[t]he purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for
an individual against an invasion of personal privacy by
requiring Federal agencies . . . to . . . be subject to civil suit
for any damages which occur as a result of willful or
intentional action which violates any individual’s right
under this Act.69
By stating that the Act is intended to subject the government to civil
suit for any damages that result from the government’s violation of
the Act, Congress clearly expressed its intent, not to distinguish
between types of damages, but to provide relief for all types of
damages—pecuniary or nonpecuniary—that result from the
government’s violations.
The text of the Act itself also supports this congressional
purpose and intent,70 as pointed out by the Ninth Circuit and Justice
Sotomayor in her dissent.71 The text of § 552a(e)(10) of the Act
requires federal agencies to “establish appropriate . . . safeguards to
insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect
67. Id. (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)).
68. Id.
69. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), (b)(6), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (emphasis
added).
70. See Frederick Z. Lodge, Damages Under the Privacy Act of 1974: Compensation and
Deterrence, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 621 (1984).
71. Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012);
FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1458–59 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity
which could result in substantial harm, embarrassment,
inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom information
is maintained.”72 Similarly, § 552a(g)(1)(C) offers civil remedies if
an agency “fails to maintain any record concerning any
individual . . . as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination
relating to the . . . character . . . of . . . the individual that may be
made on the basis of such record.”73 As some have noted, the
interests protected by these provisions appear largely to be “dignitary
interests that can only be measured in terms of mental or physical
injury.”74 As such, there is good reason to conclude that Congress
intended to provide relief for injuries to such interests by authorizing
monetary awards for nonpecuniary damages.
Surely, that Congress sought to protect these dignitary interests
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Congress also sought
to remedy the injuries to such interests by waiving immunity for
nonpecuniary damages. Justice Alito alluded to this point in Cooper
by noting that even if the Act does not authorize damages for
nonpecuniary harms, it provides other remedies, such as criminal
sanctions and injunctive relief, for the government’s violations.75
However, the provisions that impose criminal sanctions are “solely
penal and create no private right of action.”76 And injunctive relief,
which is available only to allow individuals to amend upon request
any records on them kept by the Government or to at least have such
requests reviewed properly, does not award the injured individual
any monetary damages.77 Therefore, despite the availability of these
alternate remedies under the Act, one must recognize that these do
not compensate the injured individual and are, therefore, not
particularly effective in providing direct, meaningful relief.
The common law tort of invasion of privacy, on the other hand,
offers a more direct and tangible remedy. In consideration of the
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (2006) (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
74. Lodge, supra note 70, at 621. “[T]hough economic or physical loss may be associated
with the [dignitary] injury, the primary or usual concern is not economic at all, but vindication of
an intangible right.” Id. at 621 n.65 (quoting 2 DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 7.1, at 509 (1973)).
75. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1455 n.12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)).
76. OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT, supra note 2, at 209−10; see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A)–(B); see OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT, supra note 2, at
135.
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nature of the harm that generally results from privacy invasions,78 the
tort entitles an injured individual to recover damages for “harm to his
[or her] interest in privacy” and “mental distress proved to have been
suffered if it is of a kind that normally results from such an
invasion.”79 The tort also extends recovery to other nonpecuniary
damages such as emotional distress and personal humiliation.80 And
because the common law privacy tort and the Act—the violations of
which lead to the same type of harm—seek to protect the same
interests,81 certainly Congress was aware of these common law
remedies when drafting the Act’s remedial provision. Therefore,
Congress very likely intended to incorporate these common law
remedies into the Act in order to create a more effective and
meaningful remedy for violations arising under the Act.82
The inference that Congress intended to incorporate the
principles of the common law privacy tort is further established upon
an examination of the text of the Act’s civil remedies provision.
Section 552a(g)(1)(D) authorizes an individual to bring an action
against the government for violating the Act if the individual can
show that he or she has suffered an “adverse effect” as a result.83
Subsection (g)(4)(A) then allows recovery of a monetary award so
long as the government’s violation is found to have been intentional

78. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9 (1967) (noting that the primary damage in
right-of-privacy cases is mental distress); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.1(1), at 259
(2d ed. 1993) (noting that an invasion of privacy often results only in an “affront to the plaintiff’s
dignity,” “damage to his self-image,” and mental distress); Lodge, supra note 70, at 621−22
(noting that “the type of damages most likely to occur” from violations of privacy rights is
nonpecuniary).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977).
80. Id. § 652H, cmt. b. Other privacy statutes similarly provide monetary damages for
nonpecuniary harms. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) in Support of Respondent at 6–11, Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (No. 10-1024) for a list of
federal privacy statutes that recognize damages for mental and emotional distress.
81. See supra notes 55−56, 69−74 and accompanying text.
82. In Johnson v. Department of Treasury, IRS, the Fifth Circuit actually stated in a footnote
that “Congress did indeed borrow from the common law tort . . . .” 700 F.2d 971, 977 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). The court pointed
to a statement made by Senator Edmund Muskie during the congressional hearings: The Privacy
Act “draws upon the constitutional and judicial recognition accorded to the right of privacy and
translates it into a system of procedural and substantive safeguards against obtrusive Government
information gathering practices.” Id. (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 36,897 (1974), reprinted in
SUBCOMM. ON GOV’T INFO. & INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, JOINT COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 94TH
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 311 (1976) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK]).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (2006).
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or willful.84 Because courts generally have accepted that mental or
emotional distress constitutes an “adverse effect” under the Act,85 it
is unreasonable “[t]o recognize that the Act entitles one to actual
damages for an adverse effect related to one’s mental or emotional
well-being, or one’s character, . . . while holding that one injured
under the Act cannot recover actual damages for nonpecuniary
injuries . . . .”86
Thus, an examination of the Act’s text, purpose, and overall
context subjects the term “actual damages” to only one plausible
interpretation and leads to the conclusion that Congress
unequivocally intended to waive sovereign immunity from liabilities
for nonpecuniary damages. Interpreting the term otherwise, as the
Cooper Court did,87 creates discrepancies between the Act’s purpose
and effect as well as in its substantive and remedial provisions.
B. The Cooper Court Improperly Relied
on Doe v. Chao and Legislative History
To nonetheless reject a finding of clear congressional intent, the
Cooper Court relied heavily on Doe v. Chao and the legislative
history of the Act.88 The Cooper Court concluded that the exclusion
of the terms “special damages” and “general damages” from the Act,
despite the parallels drawn between the Act and common law
defamation torts, suggests that Congress could have intended “actual
damages” to mean pecuniary damages.89 The Court’s conclusion,
however, is unwarranted for three reasons.
First, nothing in the remedial scheme or purpose of the Act
suggests that “actual damages” and “special damages” are
synonymous terms. In defining “special damages” as proven
pecuniary damages, the Chao Court expressly declined to hold that
“actual damages,” too, are limited to pecuniary losses.90 Indeed, that
Congress chose to use the term “actual damages” instead of “special
84. Id. § 552a(g)(4).
85. See Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012)
(citations omitted) (noting that in addition to the Ninth Circuit, “at least seven other [circuit
courts] have recognized that a nonpecuniary harm, such as emotional distress, may constitute an
adverse effect under the Act”).
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 66−68 and accompanying text.
88. See discussion supra Part III.
89. See discussion supra Part III.
90. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622 n.5 (2004).
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damages” despite the parallels makes it more likely that Congress did
not intend to limit recovery to pecuniary damages.
Second, there is nothing to suggest that “actual damages” and
“general damages” are synonymous terms, either. As the Cooper
Court explained, general damages “cover ‘loss of reputation, shame,
mortification, injury to the feelings and the like and need not be
alleged in detail and require no proof.’”91 This does not mean that
general damages are equivalent to or limited to nonpecuniary
damages; rather, it indicates only that general damages can include
nonpecuniary damages that are not proven. In fact, the Chao Court
stated that in the context of privacy and defamation torts, “general
damages” mean presumed damages, and they are “calculated without
reference to any specific harm.”92 Therefore, as the Chao Court held,
“[t]he deletion of ‘general damages’ from the [Privacy Act] is fairly
seen . . . as a deliberate elimination of any possibility of . . . awarding
presumed damages,”93 not as an elimination of awarding
nonpecuniary damages.
Third, the discussion of general damages in the Act’s legislative
history further undermines the Cooper Court’s reliance on legislative
history. Prior to the enactment of the Act, the original House bill
advocated a higher standard for holding the government liable. The
House bill provided for “actual damages resulting from the willful,
arbitrary, or capricious action of an agency.”94 The original Senate
bill, on the other hand, was more generous to the injured individual
and provided for “any actual damages sustained” as well as “punitive
damages where appropriate.”95 Then, the Senate bill, as passed in
November 1974, also provided for “general damages.”96 This was
the only portion of the legislative history—other than the PPSC’s

91. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1451 (2012) (quoting COOLEY & HAGGARD, supra
note 59, § 164, at 579).
92. Chao, 540 U.S. at 621.
93. Id. at 623 (emphasis added). Prior Supreme Court cases also distinguish between
presumed and proven damages in the context of defamation torts, as opposed to distinguishing
between pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262–64
(1978); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974).
94. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 18 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 311.
95. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 304(b)(1), (b)(2) (as introduced by Senator Sam Ervin, May 1,
1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 27.
96. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 303(c)(1) (as passed by the Senate, Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 371.
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recommendation—mentioning the term “general damages.”97
Ultimately, the final version of the Act reflected a compromise
between the more government-friendly House bill and the more
citizen-friendly Senate bill. The Act dropped the Senate bill’s
proposal to grant punitive damages and general damages and
lowered the House’s proposed standard of recovery to just “willful or
intentional” governmental action.98
This compromise, particularly the exclusion of “general
damages,” again provides little insight into whether Congress
intended to eliminate monetary awards for nonpecuniary harms.
Congress’s rejection of PPSC’s recommendation to allow recovery
for general damages similarly has little, if any, bearing on that
question. Accordingly, the exclusion of general damages from the
Act does not, as the Cooper Court stated, “ma[ke] clear that
[Congress] viewed [general damages and nonpecuniary damages] as
mutually exclusive.”99 Rather, it indicates, at best, that Congress
likely intended to eliminate any recovery for presumed damages—
“without reference to any specific harm.”100
Therefore, the Cooper Court’s conclusion that it is plausible to
interpret the remedial provision as encompassing only pecuniary
damages lacks support.
V. CONCLUSION
The Cooper Court could have arrived at a clear answer to its
question by using the traditional tools of statutory construction, and

97. A keyword search of the term “general damages” in the Privacy Act’s legislative history,
as compiled in the “Sourcebook” and reported in Westlaw, revealed that the term was used nine
times in the legislative history. The term appears on page 371 of the Sourcebook as part of the
Senate Bill that was passed in November 1974 and again on page 433 as part of the House Bill, as
passed by the Senate. The term also appears in proposals for additional privacy legislation by
Senator Sam Ervin and Representative Bella Abzug, dated before the final Senate and House bills
were passed. S. 2963, 93d Cong. § 308(e) (as introduced by Senator Ervin, Feb. 5, 1974),
reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 647; H.R. 13872, 93d Cong. § 552a(g)(1) (as
introduced by Representative Abzug, Apr. 2, 1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at
733. Additionally, the term appears in four other places in the history, but is mentioned only in
connection to the PPSC’s role in determining whether general damages should be provided. See
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 488, 855, 859, 987. Finally, the term appears in the summary of
the amendments to S. 3418. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 768.
98. See Todd Robert Coles, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An
Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 974 (1991).
99. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1452 (2012).
100. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621−23 (2004).
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so it did not need to “seek refuge in a canon of construction”101—
namely, the sovereign immunity canon. But this is precisely what the
Court did. As a result, it adopted an overly restrictive and literal
interpretation of the term “actual damages” in the Act’s civil
remedies provision. The Court required an unnecessarily explicit
articulation of congressional intent of waiver when proper
application of the traditional modes of statutory interpretation
already pointed to only one plausible interpretation of “actual
damages.”102 This insistence, however, unnecessarily burdens
Congress with the need to intervene and amend legislation when it
has already expressed its intent clearly.103 And as Justice Stevens
stated in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Nordic Village,104
“the interest in requiring the Congress to draft its legislation with
greater clarity or precision does not justify a refusal to make a goodfaith effort to ascertain the actual meaning of the message it tried to
convey in a statutory provision that is already on the books.”105
More importantly, the Cooper Court has created a significant
barrier for the large majority of individuals who will seek relief
under the Act. Despite the substantive duties and restraints that the
Act imposes upon federal agencies, the Court’s holding reduces the
government’s incentives to comply with the Act. And it also reduces
the incentives for injured individuals to bring civil actions against the

101. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v.
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589−90 (2008)).
102. In doing so, the Court undermined Congress’s purpose and refused to give effect to it.
See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating
Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527,
564–65 (1998) (noting that an interpretation of statutory text that is too rigorous actually presents
the danger of “undermin[ing] Congress’ purpose in enacting a statute”).
103. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 45 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009−20, 2019 (2006) (quoting W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1974) (“[W]e do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore
persuasive evidence of Congress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time to revisit the
matter and to restate its purpose in more precise English . . . .’”); John Paul Stevens, Is Justice
Irrelevant?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (1993) (arguing against a strict application of the
sovereign immunity canon because it is a “judge-made rule of strict construction of waivers of
sovereign immunity” and refusing to look at contrary legislative history because it is just “another
piece of judicially-crafted armor plate”).
104. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
105. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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government.106 Thus, there is now a “disconnect between the Act’s
substantive and remedial provisions,”107 rendering the Act
“[t]oothless.”108 This gap will become even more troubling as
technological advances improve the government’s ability to collect
and disseminate large quantities of data and, consequently, to invade
privacy interests.109
Therefore, Congress should override the Cooper Court’s
decision by amending the text of the Act’s civil remedies provision
(§ 552a(g)(1)(C)) to include language explicitly specifying, like they
do with the common law tort of invasion of privacy, that “actual
damages” include nonpecuniary harms, such as mental or emotional
distress, and that monetary awards are allowed for those harms. Only
by satisfying the “Court’s . . . insistence on ‘clear statements’” will
Congress be able to restore meaning and force to its protective intent
behind the Privacy Act.110

106. Even if an agency violates a provision of the Act, many individuals are unlikely to
receive any compensation from the government. Alex Kardon, Damages Under the Privacy Act:
Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 710
(2011); see also Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1459 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that agencies
can “intentionally or willfully forgo establishing safeguards to protect against [invasions of
privacy] and no successful private action could be taken against [them] for the harm Congress
identified”).
107. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1459 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108. Kardon, supra note 106, at 710 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Anne S. Kimbol, The Privacy Act May Be Toothless, HEALTH L. PERSP., Sept. 2008, at 4,
available at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/(AK)%20privacy%20act.pdf).
Another commentator even stated that a narrow reading of the term “actual damages” “mak[es] a
total mockery of the Privacy Act.” Id. (quoting Daniel Solove, The Nature of Privacy Harms:
Financial and Physical Harm vs. Emotional and Mental Harm, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 15,
2010),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/01/the-nature-of-privacy-harmsfinancial-and-physical-harm-vs-emotional-and-mental-harm.html); see also Lodge, supra note 70,
at 621–22 (stating that a restrictive interpretation “would render the remedial provisions of the
Act ineffective” and “frustrate the intended purpose of the civil remedy”).
109. See Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 457 (1995).
110. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

